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ABSTRACT 
The interim Constitution and the final Constitution, respectively Act 200 of 
1996 and Act 108 of 1996, has ushered South Africa into a new era. An era 
that will be characterized by it's influence on our jurisprudenti~l, political, 
socio-economic and religious rights. 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 in general and workplace forums in 
particular ushered 'oiir labour relatfons,•cfoto a new era. It is, our attempt by 
'i&e- legislature""i~" 't~;t~ .. -corp-~~;ti;;· ;t--th~ ~~teq,ris~.==it--i; h~p;d that 
--- ----------,. •• ___ ,..·~...-.-------=-'-"--:_~:--_,-_ -- .. - - -.:_.-_-:-.:_-~--~-""""'-~--.. ····---=.:~,-,,-_~ __ ~--,--------::- -~·•:~=--_:.~-,,.~-~,........,-.:oc.· --··--------:::- ~- --'---,::..· ' 
workplace participatory structures such as workplace forums will lead t9: 
----~•-=::s.,.-.,.,-;-.c;'"'C"'- -••.......:=,-:<--'--"'-- •- --~--~,-.__-_.Li..,_'>,....,•r..<.---"'----=•:--,c~_.._.,,_._,c-_-=-=c_""""-----"'=-c----'.,..--s"""_=c,-."' ~-'-•~ -~-,c-,~~-- .. ..._-~ -n ~ --'--=- •.=, c=•ooc ._~.,. 
better information flow and communication between management and 
.. - -~ -- -·- - - --- - ,,.-,.-"---'- ---=-=-..::.-,.,._---,_..._-=.,,,..-=- -:,__,.,--==--"- - ---=-- • ---~ ,_ -~ ---~ ·--~------
1he..lY..orke1:_s; 
better decision making by managell)ent; __ 
~-~ _ __,,__.-
efficiency and productivity which will help the national economy. 
The legislative framework that regulates the establishment of workplace 
forums however, present certain problems. The major obstacles that the act 
create is, firstly; the granting of the sole right to call for the establishment of 
workplace forums to majority unions (section 80(2)) and secondly; the high 
threshold of 100 employees that is required by section 84 of the Labour 
Relations Act. 
These provisions are critically analysed from a comparative perspective. It 
is argued that the high threshold is totally inexplicable and unacceptable. It 
is contrary to the trend in Europe where experiments with workplace based 
structures were highly successful. This high threshold is also totally 
insensitive to the needs of SMME's. It is a known fact that workers in this 
sector are vulnerable, exploited and deserving of legislative or other forms 
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of protection. The introduction or legislative facilitation of the establishment 
of workplace forums in SMME' s has potential to serve as a counterbalancing 
force. By engaging management and workers in a joint forum may of the 
problems in SMME's can be eradicated. 
The position of the majority unions is also untenable. The legislature has in 
fact disempowered those that it seeks to empower - the workers. In most 
countries studied, unions not necessarily majority unions have the right to 
trigger the process of establishing "workplace forums." In other countries, 
like Germany workers that are not union members can also trigger the 
process. This power that is give to majority unions also further marginalises 
SMME's. The SMME section is not sufficiently unionised because of the 
organizational problems that they present. In Britain for instance, only 8% 
of small companies are unionised. Unions will have logistic difficulties of 
organising and servicing a multitude of workplaces containing relatively 
small numbers of members. 
Section 80(2) and Section 84 of the Labour Relations Act will have to be 
revisited with a view of making workplace forums an all inclusive process 
and not one dominated by majority unions. The threshold for entitlement will 
have to be lowered so that more employees can enjoy the potential benefits 
of workplace base institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
The interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, and the Final 
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, has ushered South Africa into a new 
era. An era that will have a profound influence on our jurisprudential, 
political, socio-economic and religious rights. The Constitution was 
adopted as the supreme law of the land so as to "Heal the divisions 
of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights, Lay the foundation for 
a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law, 
Improve the equality of life for all citizens and free the potential of 
each person, and Build a united and democratic South Africa able/. 
to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations."v 
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Likewise the labour Relations Act, Act 66/1995, in general and 
workplace forums in particular ushered or Labour Relations into an 
new era. According to Du Tait, the provision for workplace forums 
"is the most radical innovation of the Act in that the concept it 
embodies is entirely new to or law."2 
The need for and purpose of this innovation is succinctly stated by 
the drafters of the Act. According to them "workplace forums are 
designed to facilitate a shift, at the workplace, from adversarial 
collective bargaining on all matters to joint problem-solving and 
participating on certain subjects. In creating a structure for ongoing 
dialogue between management and workers, statutory recognition 
is given to the realization that unless workers and managers work 
together more effectively they will fail adequately to improve 
productivity and living standards. Workplace forums are designed to 
perform functions that collective bargaining cannot easily achieve: 
the joint solution of problems and the resolution of conflicts over 
production. Their purpose is not to undermine collective bargaining 
but to supplement it. They achieve this purpose by relieving 
collective bargaining of functions to which it is not well suited. 
1. Preamble to Constitution Act of 1996. 
2. Du Toit et al: The Labour Relations Act 1995 Butterworths 1996 at p227. 
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The forum's focus is qualitative - that is, it is on non-wage matters, 
such as restructuring, the introduction of new technologies and work 
methods, changes in the organization of work, physical conditions 
of work and health and safety, all issues best resolved at the level 
of the workplace. Workplace forums expand workers representation 
beyond the limits of collective bargaining by providing workers with 
an institutionalized voice in managerial decisions. "3 
We are also informed by the drafters of the LRA, that in European ~ 
countries where participatory structures at the workplace exits, there \ ~ 
is an indication that they contribute to economic performance. 
According to the drafters research has shown that economic 
performance is enhanced in the following way: 
■ the flow of communication between management and the 
workforce is improved. 
■ the quality of decisions is improved because proposals are 
carefully scrutinized, flaws are discovered early and the range of 
alternatives explored and enlarged; 
■ the implementation of decisions is facilitated where the decisions 
is the result of informed input from the workplace; and 
■ the top level of the organization is provided with feedback on its 
middle management. "4 
Jeremy Baskin observes that "unions have been vocal proponents of 
the need to limit managerial prerogative and empower workers at all 
levels of the economy. The RDP included, largely at COSATU's 
insistence, the call for workers participation and decision making in 
the world of work. With NEDLAC and the workplace forums, South 
Africa has one of the most institutionalized forms of concertation ( or 
corporatism) in the world. Ironically this has emerged without any 
explicit union commitment to co-determination 
3. Explanatory memorandum that accompanied the Labour Relations Bill: 
Government Gazette No. 16259, Notice 97 of 1995, dated 10 February 
1995, page 135 
4. Explanatory memo Supra 136 
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incomes accords and the social democratic type politics which 
normally accompany such developments." s 
It is true that the RDP envisaged a system of worker participation 
that could increase economic growth strategies and thereby 
enhancing our position in the global village. Because of our political 
past that was driven by racial discrimination and undemocratic 
Labour Relations, it is no surprise that the RDP favours employee 
empowerment and motivation. The aim was to ensure that the 
unions "are fully involved in designing and overseeing changes at 
workplace and industry levels as well expanding the jurisdiction of 
industrial bargaining forums to include a range of RDP related policy 
issues; "s 
Will the workplace forums, as they are currently structured, be able 
to fulfill their mandate? This question will be answered by way of a 
critical appraisal of workplace forums. The critique will mainly draw 
from examples in other countries - because workplace forums are 
also a product of international "borrowing and bending. "7 
Before dealing with workplace forums it would be apposite to give a 
brief historical background of our Industrial Relations and Labour 
Law. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and later gold in 1872 on the reef 
was the start of industrialization in South Africa. Skilled employees 
were recruited from Britain and Australia. These employees brought 
5. Baskin, J: Unions at the Cross Roads can they make the transition 1996 
SALB, Vol. 20, No. 1 
6. ANC - The RDP: A policy framework 1994 
7. See Clive Thompson "Borrowing and Bending" The Development of 
South Africa's Unfair Labour Practice jurisprudence (1993) 6,3 
International Journal of Comparative Law and Industrial Relations 183 -
207 
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with them the British brand of the trade unionism "based at the time 
on the idea of a universal worker movement but balanced by the 
British sense of individualism. "a 
Skilled workers were in demand because of their scarcity. Black 
workers were used as unskilled cheap labour whilst white skilled 
employees were paid high wages. Skilled white employees saw 
black semi-skilled employees as a threat. White unions started 
insisting on guarantees for white job security. As a result of the fears 
of white employees a regulation preventing African employees from 
becoming drivers was introduced in 1897. It was followed by the 
Mines and Workers Act of 1911 which reserved thirty two job 
categories for white mineworkers. 
The Native Labour Regulation Act was passed in 1911 making it a 
crime for blacks to leave their jobs and strikes were prohibited. In 
1913 the Land Act was passed. This act forced black peasants off 
their land and created the required cheap labour. Blacks were given 
approximately 10% of South African land. Black farmers could not 
do otherwise but leave their land and go to the cities. Shortage of 
land and overcrowding forced many of these farmers into towns to 
look for work and the migratory labour system was consequently 
created. In order to retain a cheap labour supply, the pass laws 
compelled blacks to look for jobs in specific districts where 
employers most needed labour. They were forced to take any job 
offered as the Pass law only permitted them a few days in which to 
find work in the allocated area. The Chamber of mines further 
agreed upon a low maximum wage to be paid black workers. Any 
company paying more could be fined. g 
8. Bendix S, Industrial Relations in the New South Africa, 3rd Edition, Juta 
& Co. 1996, page 78: The historical background is mainly taken from 
Bendix, Finnemore and van der Merwe infra, and the Wiehahn 
Commission report infra and Ncube, D: Black Trade Unions in South 
Africa Skotaville 1985 
9. Finnemore, M et Van der Merwe, R: Introduction to Labour Relations in 
SA 4th Edition, Butterworths 1993, 23 
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From the early 1900's onwards strike action by both white and black 
employers increased. White workers started a major strike in 1913. 
By the time they already formed industrial unions as opposed to craft 
unions, in order to include white semi-skilled workers as well. They 
mobilized their interest on the basics of race than craft. 
Black workers also started a strike in 1913. In 1914 there were 
strikes at railways and power stations as well as general strikes by 
white employees. The government answered by proclaiming martial 
law and deporting a number of white immigrant trade Union Leaders. 
Blacks were not yet unionized. They only started organizing after the 
formation of the Industrial and Commercial workers union of SA 
(ICU) under the leadership of Clements Kadalie in 1919. In 1922 the 
Rand Rebellion erupted. Retrenched white workers sparked a 
general and crippling strike. The 1922 rebellion also increased 
hostility towards black workers because they were seen, by their 
white counterparts, as a threat to white interests. 
In 1924 the Conciliation Act was passed. Its primary purpose was to 
prevent industrial unrest, by providing the machinery for collective 
bargaining and for conciliation of disputes. The act was later 
amended to cater for conciliation boards and industrial councils and 
placed a criminal sanction on strike action which occurred without 
prior arbitration. This act gave white trade unions statutory 
recognition but excluded all pass-bearing blacks from the definition 
of employee. 
In 1925 the wage Act, which applied to Blacks, was enacted. It 
provided for the unilateral determination of wages and working 
conditions where there was no agreement under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. During this time more and more black trade unions 
were formed. 
In 1930 a multiracial conference assembled and the South African 
Traders and Labour Council (TLC) was established. The TLC 
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relentlessly, but unsuccessfully, called for the inclusion of Black 
Trade Unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
In 1942 all the existing black unions and federations came together 
to form the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). 
Because of a lack of statutory backing unions under the CNETU 
were relatively weak. This weakness is the reason why the 
Chambers of Mines and the government could easily crush a strike 
by 75 000 black immigrant worker in 1946. 
In 1948 the National Party gained power after elections. They acted 
swiftly and repressively to crush the black workers movement. In 
1944 the TLC, under the influence of many of its members who were 
also members of the Communist Party, drew up a workers Charter 
which placed the federation on a socialist path. The Charter stated 
that "the people of South Africa are not prepared to go back to the 
conditions of the pre-war world, nor will they accept the uncertain 
and unplanned anarchy of production and distribution visualized by 
most sections of the capitalized class. The organized workers in the 
trade union movement know full well that the only solution to our 
problems lies in South Africa adopting Socialism as our form of 
government, which will bring emancipation to the working people 
from exploitation and oppression and will place the common people 
in control of South Africa. This must be the aim of the trade union 
movement. But we cannot sit back with folded arms and wait for the 
"Socialist Dawn" nor does it mean that we cannot in the course of our 
struggle win great improvement for the workers of South Africa, 
despite resistance which is being and will be exercised by the 
capitalist forces to maintain their privileged position." 10 
Needless to say the Nationalist government passed the suppression 
of communism act in 1950 as a direct response to the proliferation 
of unions and to silence opposition. Large numbers of trade union 
10. As quoted in Finnemore and van der Merwe Supra at 26 
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leaders, members of political movements such as SACP were 
arrested or banned. The ANC (African National Congress) which 
was formed in 1912 was also the target of the legislation. The 
government also appointed a commission to investigate existing 
labour legislation. The Botha commission, as it was called, was of 
the view that parity restoration for white and black employees would 
put white supremacy at stake. The Commission recommended that 
separate bargaining bodies for blacks would be established. Black 
unions had to be allowed subject to stringent conditions and that 
strike action should be prohibited. The government accepted some 
of the recommendations and passed the Botha Labour (settlement 
of disputes) Act, later known as the Black Labour Relations 
Regulations Act in 1953. 
The Black Labour Act was an attempt to kill trade unionism amongst 
blacks. This act made provision for the establishment of workers 
committees for black employees. These committees were to be 
established on the initiative of the employees themselves. 
Complaints were to be taken to the regional workers committees, 
consisting of blacks appointed by the Minister of Labour, under a 
white chairman. The regional committees were also to act as 
watchdogs over conditions of work pertaining to black employees 
and had to report to the Black Labour Board, which had a all white 
membership. According to Bendix the system of workers committees 
proved to be unpopular, because very few employees had the 
initiative to form committees and, even where they did, they had 
lacked the necessary expertise to present themselves efficiently. 
Besides employees shortcomings, there was the additional problem 
that only one workers committee, consisting of five members, was 
allowed per plant, preventing effective representation. Also, where 
committees did exit, they merely raised grievances and did not 
interact on a regular basis with management. What Bendix does not 
mention however, is that the early fifties was characterized by stay 
aways the defiance campaign and a out and out rejection of workers 
committees by black unions. It is therefore not surprising that in 
1953 the Public Safety Act was enacted which prescribed a three 
year sentence for civil disobedience. 
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In 1954 TUSCA (Trade Union Council of South Africa) was formed 
to represent mainly industry based unions. Initially its members were 
only white registered unions later it allowed black union membership. 
Due to government pressure it expelled black unions in 1967. In 
1955 SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions) was formed. 
It maintained political links with the ANC and was active in promoting 
a political role for trade unions. Many of its leaders were banned and 
detained. It was forced into exile. 
Whilst SACTU was still functional, the government used its policy to 
divide the union movement further. The government passed the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. This act caused further 
polarization because it excluded all Bantu employees. It prohibited 
mixed unions. It also prohibited unions to have mixed executes 
where permission was given for the registration of a mixed union. It 
also introduced jobs reservation whereby a particular occupation 
could be legally reserved for a certain race group to protect white 
workers and to be lesser extent coloured workers in the Cape from 
competition. 
In 1973 widespread strikes by black workers over wages, which were 
rapidly declining because of rising inflation erupted in Durban and 
spread to other centres. Industry and the government was 
panicking .. The shortcomings of the labour laws were exposed. It 
became apparent that a dangerous vacuum existed because of a 
lack of formal and acceptable negotiating structures and procedures. 
The government passed the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act. 
This act provided for the establishment of liaison committees at plant 
level, as an alternative to the already existing workers committees. 
Liaison committees were to consist of representatives of employers 
and employees, selected on a parity basis. The main purpose was 
to improve communication between the employer and black 
employees. Although they could consult on any matter of mutual 
interest, the liaison committees subsequently established often 
confined themselves to matters of physical hygiene or other paltry 
issues. The Act also gave black workers a limited right to strike after 
they have exhausted certain dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
act did not live up to the expectations of black workers. Bendix quiet 
rightly observes that the "Committee system for black employees 
was introduced in South Africa not to supplement the process of 
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collective bargaining, as has happened elsewhere in the western 
world, but to replace it. Its introduction can be ascribed partly to the 
relief that blacks were not able to engage in responsible collective 
bargaining at official level, but perhaps more to the fear of black 
union power and the fear of bargaining systems. The irony is that 
the very structure intended to destroy unionism could equally 
promote. "11 
It was clear that the black labour relations regulation act did not solve 
the "black worker" problem. The government then appointed the 
Wiehahn Commission. Prof. Wiehahn made sweeping 
recommendations. His recommendations brought tremendous 
change in our labour relations. The report inter alia recommended 
that -
■ full freedom of association be granted to all employees 
regardless of race, sex or creed. 
■ Trade unions, irrespective of composition in forms of colour, race, 
sex be allowed to register. 
■ Stricter criteria to be adopted for trade union representation 
■ A system of financial inspection of trade unions be introduced 
■ prohibition on political activity by unions be extended 
■ Liaison committees be renamed as work councils 
■ where no industrial council had jurisdiction work councils and 
worker's committees be granted full collective bargaining rights. 
■ statutory job reservation be phased out 
■ safeguards be introduced to protect minorities previously protected 
by job reservation 
■ the industrial tribunal be replaced by the industrial court 
11. Bendix Supra page 94 
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■ allowance for a closed shop be maintained 
■ a tripartite national manpower commission be established 
In 1979 the Labour Relations Act, which was repealed more the five 
times in six years, was enacted, The major changes implemented 
by the Act were 
■ full trade union rights were extended to every worker in South 
Africa irrespective of origin. 
■ full autonomy was granted in respect of their membership and all 
racial restrictions were removed and· 
■ the black labour relations regulation act was repealed 
The unions, however, did not jump at the opportunity of recognition. 
Most of the unions were very careful and skeptical. Most of them 
refused to register "either as a matter of principle and in protest at 
their exclusion or because they believed the registration would entail 
greater governmental control".12 The unions however positioned 
themselves for a bigger fight. In 1984 the government created the 
Tri-Camerial parliament thereby giving coloureds and indians political 
rights. FOSATU (Federation of South Africa Trade Unions) which 
. was formed in 1979 and CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa) 
which was formed in 1980 campaigned against the Tri-Camerial 
parliamentary elections. They formed linkages with UDF (United 
Democratic Front) that was formed in 1983. The unions used their 
massive membership and following to call for stay aways and protest 
action 
In 1985 COSATU (The Congress of South Africa Trade Unions) 
was formed. It consisted of 33 unions which amalgamated. 
12. Bendix op cit 97 
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FOSATU was part of the amalgamation. CUSA however strongly 
supported the black consciousness movement and found a home 
with NACTU (National Council of Trade Unions) and formed strong 
ties with the PAC. . 
IN 1986 UWUSA (United Workers Union of SA) was formed under 
the umbrella of the lnkatha freedom party. UWUSA was later 
exposed as the brain child of South African intelligence service. 
NACTU and COSATU supported the political struggle and called for 
sanctions, boycotts, stay aways, recognition of certain "Black" 
public holidays like June 16 the release of political organizations. 
Union leaders were again subjected to victimization and harassment 
by the state. That did not deter them. The government invoked the 
provisions of the public safety act to curtail the activities of unions -
still did not help. 
By the end of the eighties, the economy was in serious recession 
and the country was politically isolated: 
■ Sanctions, disinvestment, capital flight and general disruption led 
to massive economic losses. 
■ The cost of enforcing apartheid and maintaining a police state 
became untenable. 
■ Unemployment, crime and violence had escalated in many 
townships. 
■ Black local authorities collapsed as rent boycotts bribery, 
corruption and pressure on officials took its toll. 
The government unbanned the ANC and other political organizations. 
Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released. 
COSATU, the ANC and the SACP formed a alliance. The historic 
power of organized labour led to transformation in the early 1990's 
of the National manpower commission (NMC) from a toothless 
advisory body into a forum where business and labour interests could 
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negotiate with government. Conflicts between government and 
labour over the introduction of VAT (Value added tax) resulted in 
the formation of the National Economic Forum (NEF), structured 
along similar lines. Both were replaced by NEDLAC (National 
Economic Development and Labour Council) in 1994. NEDLAC 
consolidated and extended the pow~r of NEF and NMC. 
NEDLAC institutionalizes tripartism and envisages the negotiation 
not only of labour policy but of key aspects of fiscal, industry and 
development policy. The objects, powers and functions of NEDLAC 
are stated as: 
■ to strive to promote the goals of economic growth, participation in 
economic decision making and social equity 
■ to seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters 
pertaining to social and economic policy 
■ to consider all prop~sed labour legislation relating to labour market 
policy before it is introduced in Parliament 
■ consider all significant changes to social and economic policy 
before it is implemented or introduced in parliament 
· ■ encourage and promote the formulation of co-ordinated policy on 
social and economic matters 13. 
The scene was set for a corporative industrial relations dispensation. 
CO-OPERATION VERSUS ADVERSARIALISM 
The drafters of the LRA use the development, international 
restructuring and economic growth arguments to justify the 
13. Section 5, Act 35 of 1994 
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introduction of workplace forums in our industrial relations. 
According to them we have "to reposition ourselves because our re-
entry into international markets and the imperatives of a more open 
international economy demand that we produce value-added 
products and improve productivity"14_ We are told that restructuring 
is a "massive task" and that adversarial industrial relations will not 
be up to the task. They forcefully argue in favour of a second 
channel of industrial relations and state that in countries such as the 
United Kingdom "where the adversarial labour relations system was 
not supplemented by workplace-based institutions for worker 
representation and labour management communication- a second 
channel of industrial relations- this process fared badly. Workplace 
restructuring has been most successful in those countries where 
participatory structures exist, for example Japan, Germany and 
Sweden."1s 
The Dunlop Commission in the USA found that "employee 
participation and labour -management partnerships are essential to 
improved productivity, enhanced quality and economic performance, 
and a increased voice in higher living standards for American 
workers. It is in the national interest to see participation and 
partnerships sustained and expanded to cover larger proportion of 
the American workforce and workplaces, and to address the full -
range of issues critical to improving workplace performance and 
advancing workers economic positions and quality of working" 16. 
The links between workplace-based institutions, improved 
productivity and ultimately economic growth is a recurring theme. 
Corporation, we are told, give employees a change to have a say 
in managerial decision making. Employees can therefore be in 
control of their destiny. They can learn a lot from management and 
teach management to be sensitive to employee issues. Summers, 
a proponent of workplace based institutions, remarks that 
"examination of various labour relations systems shows I believe, 
14. See explanatory memo Supra 135 
15. Ibid 
16. The Commission on the future of worker management Relations chaired 
by Prof. Dunlop 1994, page 4 
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that no industrial society can compete and prosper in the world ] '· 
market unless there is co-operation and mutual problem solving ~ 
between management and workers. 
Workers-even unskilled and uneducated workers-know things about \ 
the reality of production process in their workplaces, the causes of ~ 
defective products, lost time and work injuries, and the potential for 
improvement which management never learns. And the workers 
have the choice to do the least required or the most possible, which 
employers can not control by command. Every knowledgeable 
personnel expert agrees that giving the workers a voice in the 
decisions which affect their working life is essential for productivity 
and profitability. 
And giving workers a voice is equally essential for improving the ~ 
quality of the employees working life and providing a democratic ~ 
workplace. The workers voice cannot be shouts of protest or 
demands, answered by the employers assertion of management 
prerogatives. The workers voice must be one which answers 
management's seeking of assistance with willingness to listen, a 
willingness to share in problem solving and a willingness to consider 
employees not as suppliers of hours of labour but as partners in the 
enterprise. "17 He further states that he does not believe "that a 
society can be democratic, an economy can prosper and· workers 
improve their life if management and employees see each other as 
adversaries " 1 a 
The other rationale for introduction of workplace forums is their non- \ 
confrontational nature. Because they facilitate and promote 
industrial peace at the workplace they are favoured above collective 
bargaining at the workplace. The envisaged scheme is for workplace 
forums to supplement collective bargaining. It can supplement 
collective bargaining if there is a separation of functions, between 
17. Summers Clyde workplace forums from a comparative perspective ( 1995) 
16ILJ 806 
18. Op cit at 809 
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distributive and productivity issues. As Summers puts it "distributive 
issues- a division of returns from the enterprise, how much goes to 
workers and how much goes to the owners or shareholders, they too 
often are inescapably confrontational ... workplace and productivity 
issues are different. Both the worker and management have shared 
concerns over the productivity and profitability of the enterprise ... 
Distributive issues... are... confrontational... productivity issues 
need to be co-operative" 19. Rogers and Streeck argue that second 
channel institutions extend their reach beyond the unionized sector. {I 
They agree that workplace institutions can supplement collective 
bargaining and state that as institutions of collective participation in I 
the enterprise, works council perform functions that unions and 
collective bargaining cannot easily perform, especially on the joint I 
solution of problems and the resolution of conflicts in production. 1 
Where they are well developed, councils support collective 
bargaining relieving it. of tasks to which it is not well suited. 
By providing management and workers with a reliable channel for \ 
problem oriented communication, they also help to integrate workers 
into the firm. Councils are generally aided (except in Spain) in 
performing this intermediate role not only by statutory support but 
also by their insulation from wage setting. With this crucial union 
function and source of conflict with management removed, they 
serve as instruments of negotiated exchange over such "qualitative", 
non wage matters as work organisation, technological change, 
personnel policy and training-issues of ten best resolved at the level 
of the individual firm. 20 
Cheadle states that workplace-based institutions have been "greeted 
with scepticism wherever they were introduced." 21The reason for the 
scepticism according to him , is firstly the unions fear that these 
institutions may undermine collective bargaining. Secondly the 
employers regard these institutions and processes as interference 
19. Ibid 
20 Roger J and Streeck W workplace Representation Overseas: The works 
Council Story in Freeman R working under different Rules Sage 
New York 1994, page 102 
21 Cheadle et al workplace Forums Current Labour Law JUTA 1995, 
page 65 
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with the free exercise of their managerial prerogatives. Although \ 
these are valid reasons, they are superficial. The other more 
fundamental reasons question the rationale and foundation of 
corporatism. 
The proponents of workplace forums seem to accept that adversarial 
industrial relations and strikes are obstacles to economic progress 
or reform. Du Toit however points out that this view is "not prevalent 
among authorities on the system of worker participation countries 
such as Germany."22 Du Toit points out that plant level industrial 
relations is understood as only one of a range of factors which, in 
combination, determine economic performance. He mentions that 
investment levels for example have been higher in "successful" 
Sweden, Germany and Japan than in unsuccessful Britain. 
The separation of distributive and productive issues can and is often 
dealt with through collective bargaining. 
Trade unions did traditionally extend collective bargaining to a wide 
range of production issues. These included training, health, safety, 
productivity guidelines etc: .. It must also be remembered that in our 
modern economical climate the destinction between productive and 
distributive issues is artificial. 
As Karl van Holdt plits it "training may mean higher wages and better 
productivity. Increased production may worsen working conditions. 
Improved quality might require better working conditions and could 
improve bonuses. Shiftwork might improve production but lead to a 
loss of overtime pay."23 
Moreover we must be mindful of the fact that the levels of output is 
not only affected by resources and technology but also by the cost 
of labour. It goes without saying that better paid people will generally 
speaking be more productive and put in more effort than underpaid 
workers. 
22. Du Toit Corporatism and Collective Bargaining in a Democratic South 
Africa 1995 ILJ, Vol. 16, Part 4, Page 785 at 789 
23 Von Holdt K: workplace forums undermining unions? SALB Vol. 19, 
No. 6 December 1995, Page 59 
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Good industrial relations can achieve what workplace forums is 
meant to achieve. If the "attitude of the actors" is positive the results, 
including productivity will also be positive. Freeman and Medolf puts 
it thus "If industrial relations are good, with management and unions 
working together to produce a bigger "pie" as well as fighting over the 
size of their slices, productivity is likely to be higher under unionism. 
If industrial relations are poor, with management and labour ignoring 
common goals to battle one another, productivity is likely to be lower 
under unionism" .24 
Our industrial relations history will also have a profound influence on 
the success of workplace forms. Our industrial relations went through 
a period of repression, mistrust and sometimes violence. The actors 
will have to change their attitude and style of dealing with and solving 
problems. 
The corporatism envisaged by the Labour Relations Act has potential 
to be confrontational.2s One can only hope that we wont have more 
strikes because of strikes that start in workplace forums. 
We are faced with a big and ever increasing economic problem. We 
are in a state of near economic recession. The global workers are at 
a very low if not at all time low. The rand dollar rate is one dollar to 
six rands. Likewise the pound sterling is equal to eleven rands. 
Economic crises is both a reason for developing consensual policies, 
and an "obstacle to the chances of corporatist success"26 
Globalization and liberalization and deregulation also poses as a 
problem for a successful implementation of a corporatist system. 
Baskin also points out that unions lack professionalism and capacity 
to easily adopt the corporatist model. He argues that unions are no 
24 As quoted by Macum Ian in Labour Productivity: Unions Strategy and 
Workplace SALB Vol. 19, No. 4, September 1995, Page 49 at 53 
25. see discussion on right to strike infra 
26. Baskin, J: The trend towrads Bargained corporatism 1993 SALB Vol. 17, 
No. 3, Page 64 at 69 
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match for their intended partners.27 He also points out that 
Ideologically, too, it can be argued that the union movement is ill 
equipped for the corporatist approach .. there is an established 
tradition of unions and employers reaching compromise settlements 
and package deals , even after the most extreme conflict with all 
these potential problems one might ask whether workplace forums 
will indeed be the panacea that it is made out to be. 
THE HIGH THRESHOLD 
In terms of section 79 of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 a 
workplace forum must: 
• seek to promote the interest of all employers in the workplace, 
whether or not they are trade union members 
• seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace 
• is entitled to be consulted by the employee 
• is entitled to participate in joint decision-making about the matters 
referred to in section 86 
It is therefore clear that the purpose of workplace forum is to give 
workers a say in the governance of the workplace. It must facilitate 
communication, consensus and co-operation between management 
and labour production related issues which are explicitly stated in 
section 84 and 86 of the Act. 
Wolfgang Streeck 2a makes five basic points to illustrate the 
importance of what he calls co determination. He says firstly it is the 
collective participation of workers in the management of the 
workplace, or in the management of production. Secondly co-
determination limits managerial prerogative. Information sharing, 
consultation and co-determination is also one of the reasons why 
management does not like co-determination because of the inroads 
that it makes on management power. Thirdly, it involves worker 
involvement in distributive issues. It is therefore about how labour 
and capital interact in the workplace to produce the product that later 
27 Baskin Supra 69 
28 Streeck Wolfgang: Co-determination and Unions 1994 SALB Vol. 18, 
No. 5, Page 87 
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\ 
gets distributed. Labour can influence production pro-actively. 
Fourthly, such intervention in managerial decision - making and in 
managerial prerogative Is usually based on legal rights or a legally 
backed industrial agreement and not just on the sheer power of the 
union at the workplaces. Fifthly and more importantly he makes the 
point that "co-determination" typically does not take place through 
unions or collective bargaining, but through works councils. 
If it is accepted that workplace forums, with their statutory rights to 
co-determination, have too many advantages then it is not clear why 
our legislature decided to put it out of reach for so many employees 
and, may I add, employers. 
In terms of section 84 of the Act a workplace forum may only be 
established in a workplace in which an employer employs more than 
100 employees. This threshold for entitlement to workplace forums 
is very high. In Germany the threshold for triggering the 
establishment of a works councils is remarkably lower. There, 
Germany, five employees is needed to trigger the process. Only 
three of the five employees must have voting rights. 
In Spain the work centre council, which is the "representative and 
collegiate organ of the personnel of the enterprise for the defense of 
their interest", is the organ through which employees participate in 
the enterprise. In terms of Spain's Employee Statute (ET) there shall 
be one council in every work centre which occupies 50 or more 
employees. Thus, if the enterprise has more than one work centre 
with 50 or more employees, one council must be elected in each. If 
the enterprise has several centres, none of them with 50 employees 
but the total sum reaches 50, there shall be a "conjoint council", the 
only one for all the work centres. In a enterprise with more than one 
work centre which occupies 50 or more employees each, it is 
possible to form an "inter-work centre council" in addition to the 
other. The inter-work centre council can however only be created 
through a collective agreement. The Spanish system however also 
provides for the election of a delegate where there are between six 
and ten employees.29 
29 Manual A Olea and F Rodriquez - Sanudo: Spain in Blanpain (ed) 
International Encyclopaedia of Labour Law and IR Vol. 11 
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In Greece, the law distinguishes between two systems. Where 
workers are represented by another entity (such as a union) and 
situations where they are not. When the workers are represented, 
fifty employees are necessary for an outside representative. When 
they are not represented, the works council in practice constitutes 
the only form of representation. In such cases only twenty employees 
are necessary to establish a works council.30 
In France the establishment of a comite'd enterprise is mandatory in 
any enterprise employing at least fifty employees. The committee 
must be established whenever the size of fifty employees is 
maintained for twelve months, whether consecutively or not during 
a three year period. If the number of employees falls below fifty, the 
enterprise committee must remain, unless an agreement is reached 
with all the representative unions in the plant, or unless on request 
the Departmental Director of Labour and Employment permits its 
abolition. The Director must be satisfied that there is a "durable and 
important reduction in the number·of employees".31 
In the Netherlands the right to form works councils was extended to 
employees when their number is between ten and thirty-five.32 
In Switzerland the establishment of works councils is not mandatory. 
They are not even institutionalised. The main nation wide collective 
agreements however provide for the constitution of works councils, 
which are elected by the workers and represent them before the 
management. Alexander points out that the 1988 collective 
agreement for the machine industry provides that when in an 
enterprise there is no workers representation, one fifty of the workers 
may ask for a ballot. If the result shows that a majority of the workers 
want the establishment of a workers representation structure then 
such structures, (works councils) must be created.33This agreement 
does not state the minimum employees, but it is clear that there must 
be a minimum of five employees who are employed in the enterprise. 
30 See Biagi M: Employer Representation in SMME's a comparative 
overview 1992 coparative Labour Law Journal 257 
31 Michel Despax and Jacques Rojot: France in Blanpain (ed) International 
Encyclopedia ... Supra 
32 Biagi Supra 261 
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The threshold in most European countries is far lower than ours. 
Belgium however requires one hundred employees for the 
establishment of a works council. If the number falls below one 
hundred then the functions of the council are transferred to the 
health and safety committee. It is unclear why the legislature opted 
for such a high threshold. 
I cannot but agree with Oliver when he says that the high threshold 
is unjustified.34 Moreover this high threshold does not augur well for 
SMME's. 
THE POSITION OF SMME's 
It is practically impossible to fund a definition for SMME's. There are 
as many definitions as there are Commentators on SMME's. The ILO 
uses the expression in its broadest sense, ranging from modern 
enterprises with up to 50 employees, to businesses employing three 
or four family members, but also including domestic industries co-
operatives, individual enterprises, micro enterprises, self employed 
workers in the informal sector, etc .. 35 Our legislature has decided to 
use a qualitative and a quantitative definition to define SMME's. In 
terms of the schedule to the Act (Act 102/1996) the definition of an 
enterprise will depend on the sector, size or class, total full time 
equivalent of paid employees, total turnover and the total gross 
33 Alexandre Berenstein: Spain in Blanpain (ed) Supra Vol 12 160 
34 Olivier in Worplace Forums - Critical Questions from a Labour Law 
perspective 1996 ILJ Vol 17 No 5 page 803 
35 ILO: The promotion of small and medium sized enterprises Report iv 
Inter Labour Conference Geneva 1986. See also Servais Jean Michel: 
Labour Law in SMME: An ongoing Challenge: International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 1994 Vol. 10, 
Page 119. Du Toit D: Small Enterprises Industrial Relations and the RDP 
1995 ILJ Vol. 16, Part 3, Page 544. Du Toit in footnote 3 states that the 
National Manpower Commission (NMC) used the following categories: 
Micro = workplaces employing up to five employees, small up to ten or 
twenty and medium up to 50 or one hundred. 
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asset value of the enterprise.3s If one has regard to the schedule if 
it is clear that most SSME's will be excluded from the benefits of 
workplace forums most of the sectors must have less than 100 
employees to quality to be typified as medium sized enterprises. 
The government's policy is to get SMME's involved in economic 
development both on a macro as well as a micro scale. Act 102/1996 
was enacted to achieve this and equal treatment for all employees. 
The preamble to the National Small Business Enabling Act in draft 
Bill form 37 encapsulates government policy- it states "Since the 
constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1993 (Act No 
200/1993) provides that measures may be designed to achieve the 
adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and are 
not subject to economic and social prejudice irrespective of colour, 
race, class, belief or gender, and since the issues of economic 
empowerment , job creation and equitable growth have been placed 
high on the agenda of the Government of National Unity in South 
Africa, especially given that millions of South Africans are 
unemployed and underemployed, and since the Government is of the 
view that small, medium and micro enterprises represent an 
important vehicle to address the challenge of job creation, economic 
growth and equity in South Africa as part of an integrated strategy to 
make our economy more diversified, enhance productivity, stimulate 
investment and encourage entrepreneurship; and since numerous 
constrains, both historical and economic, have hindered the full 
participation of small, medium and micro enterprises in the economy, 
there is the endeavour to bring small business from the margins into 
the heart of economic activity, and to provide a mechanism to enable 
the increased participation of black owned or controlled enterprises 
in the production of value added goods in wealth generating 
enterprises and export markets. 
From the above one can assume that the Government is aware of 
the enormous and profound influence that SMME's can have on the 
36 See Sec 1 read with the schedule of Act 102/1996. (The National Small 
Business Act) 
37 Government Gazette No 16876 Notice No 1304 of 1995 of 15-12-1995 
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national economy. So too can one assume that the Government is 
aware of the fact that employees in the SMME sector are working 
under unsatisfactory working conditions and that their inputs in 
productivity, restructuring of the workplace etc .. is very minimal if 
any. SMME's more than big enterprises need institutionalised labour 
relations because they are not always unionised. As Servais puts it 
"In view of their inability to successfully organise workers in this 
sector, trade unions cannot easily monitor the implementation of the 
labour law or the improvement of conditions of employment by 
collective agreement."3a Likewise it will be very difficult for 
government agencies to monitor whether employees in this sector 
are treated as their counterparts in big enterprises. Workplace 
forums could have gone a long way in playing at least a watchdog 
role to see to it that workers in this sector are not marginalised. This 
high threshold has effectively excluded up to 74% of the worker in 
the formal sector.39 
Many employers and employees in the SMME sector are not 
educated and do not have the necessary resources, facilities and 
infrastructure to implement workplace forums. This however should 
not be a factor to be used against lowering the threshold. In 
Germany many small and in quite a few medium sized plants no 
works councils are elected, in spite of the law. There are many 
reasons for such abstentions, ranging from the employers pressure 
up to the fact that workers simply lack information on what they give 
up if they do not establish a works council. In short ; the law is only 
observed to its full extent in the bigger plants."40 
The threshold problem is compounded by the definition of employee 
and workplace. In terms of section 78 (a) employee means any 
person who is employed in a workplace, except a senior managerial 
employee whose contract of employment or status confers the 
authority to any of the following in the workplace: 
• employ and dismiss employees on behalf of the employer 
38 Servais Supra 124 
39 See Olivier Supra at 809 
40 Weiss M: The German model of worker participation. Some lessons in 
Hepple B (ed) Union Right in the Single market, London ICTUR 1991, 
Page 67 
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• represent the employer in dealings with the workplace 
forums; or 
• determine policy and take decisions on behalf of the employer 
that may be in conflict with the representation of employees in 
the workplace 
In terms of this definition, all employees i.e. trial period, casual and 
seasonal employees are included in the definition. In Germany, of 
the five employees needed to trigger the process, three of them must 
have been employed for at least six months. In France, fixed term 
contract employees, home workers, employees whose contract of 
employment is. suspended, traveling salesman, handicapped 
employees working under special conditions, employees working in 
foreign countries, apprentices, part-time employees whose hours of 
work amount to at least 20 per week or 85 hours per month, part-
time employees working below these limits who (as is the case for 
temporary workers or employees seconded from another enterprise 
but working on the premises) are counted in proportion to the time 
spent on the premises.41 
The France definition is too wide. The German one too rigid. Part of 
the South African definition is more practical. This part is however 
not problematic. Likewise parts (i and ii) of the definition is not 
problematic. Du Toit points out that it is difficult to ascertain at which 
point a particular level of decision making may be in conflict with the 
representation of employees and indeed what precisely is meant by 
he expression, could be contentions.42 
In Germany leading personnel: are also excluded from participation 
in or representation by works councils. In enterprises that have more 
than 100 employees however special economic committees of works 
councils must be established. They facilitate and give content to the 
works councils rights of consultation in respect of economic or 
financial proposals. In this sense works councils have access to 
experts on matters economic. 
41 Depax and Rojot Supra 185 
42 Du Toit et al: The Labour Relations Act 1995 Butterworths 1996: 
Page 234 
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In France all permanent employees, employed as wage earners up 
to and including a salaried director may participate and be 
represented in enterprise committees. The vagueness of part (iii) of 
the definition means that more SMME's will find it difficult to reach 
the threshold. Many "executive employees" who may help, 
contribute and enhance the work of workplace forums are also cut 
out of the process. This may lead to valuable resources going astray. 
In Germany executive staff that were excluded from works councils 
established their own representative body on the basis of an 
agreement between this group and the employer. This was pure 
voluntary agreements. The legislature in order to promote uniformity 
passed the 1989 Act on a Representative Body for executive staff. 
There is currently a legal basis for executive staff representation. In 
terms of the Act a representative body for the executive staff may be 
elected in establishment regularly employing at least 10 executive 
staff members. The executive staff decide by way of ballot whether 
such a body must be established. These bodies do not have co-
determination rights, they only have information and consultation 
rights. Although the establishment of such representative bodies for 
executive staff will be onerous and a burden, the benefits to be 
derived from them are apparent. Our act is silent on a regime for 
"senior managerial" employees. It is submitted that this is a flaw that 
must be rectified. It goes without saying that those employees 
possess more technical detail, skill, know-how and information to 
engage "management" more effectively on matter of production. 
Invariably many of them are affected by restructuring, retrenchment, 
down sizing etc ... 
Workplace is defined in sec 213 as 43 "the place or places where the 
employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on or 
conducts two or more operations that are independent of one 
another by reason of their size function or organisation, the place or 
places where employees work in connection with each independent 
operation, constitutes the workplace for that operation ... " The act 
does not state what is meant by independent operation. It does not 
give guidelines on how to determine whether a operation is 
43 Only the "private sector" definition is given. See however Du Toit et al 
The Labour Relations Act Ibid for the different forms of workplace forums 
in the public sector. 
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independent from another. It does not state what the size is required 
for an enterprise to be deemed independent. In the Netherlands one 
criterion of "independence" is whether the operation directly offers 
goods or service to the publiC.44 
In order to expose the flaw in this criterion DuToit gives the following 
example: 
'Thus a factory producing silicon chips which are then added to 
compact disc players in another factory belonging to the sane 
employer would not be independent because it offers nothing to the 
public. But, according to this criterion, different branches of a 
supermarket chain would be independent from each other." 
In France they established group enterprise committees. This 
according to Depax and Rojot was a new development in trying to 
match the social obligations bearing upon enterprises with their 
nature as economic and social entitles not as legal fictitious 
beings."45 They go on to state that the 1982 Act that established 
group enterprise committees borrowed from business law. According 
to the 1982 Act a group may be constituted by: 
• the dominant company itself 
• its direct subsidiaries, when the dominant company owns over 
50% of stock 
• its indirect subsidiaries, which can be subsidiaries or corporations 
where the dominant company itself owns less than 50% alone, but 
together with one or several subsidiaries owns over 50%; 
• other corporations, when the dominant company owns less than 
50% and more than 10% of the capital, if there are relationships 
between the corporations "with a degree of importance and 
permanence which implies the existence of actual control" and the 
belonging of both corporation to a single economic entity 
The elaborate definition and attempt to categorise independent or 
dependent companies is an indication of the magnitude of the 
problem. As Du Tait say, "such lack of precision is largely 
unavoidable."4s 
44 MG Rood lntrodutie in het social recht 4 ed (1994) 207 as quoted by Du 
Toit Supra. See also item 10 schedule 2 of the LRA 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 236 
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This lack of precision is caused because in many cases an economic 
entity may be constituted from a group of corporations where 
theoretically legally separate and independent corporations actually 
either through holding, cross-participation or inter-locking directories 
for example- belong to the same economic set. 
A good demarcation and understanding of what workplace means is 
very important and can sometimes be crucial. Unions and employers 
will implement and or amend their strategy based on their 
understanding of the definition in a particular case. "Unions may tend 
to favour workplace forums at central level in order to ensure 
consultation on the broadest possible agenda and, hence, to equate 
"workplace" with the enterprise as a whole, whereas employers who 
· are unenthusiastic about workplace forums may wish to define 
"workplace" more narrowly to exclude participation at central levels 
or to dilute union representivity, "47 The extend, interpretation and 
import of this definition will have to be developed casuistically. 
The current definition of" workplace" is also something the unions 
will have to get used to. Traditionally unions divided the workplace 
into bargaining units. The representivity of unions in a particular 
bargaining unit determined its entitlement to certain right 
concessions and privileges. 
THE POSITION OF THE MAJORITY UNION 
In terms of section 80 (2) of the LRA 1995. Any representative trade 
union may apply to the Commission in the prescribed form for the 
establishment of a workplace forum. In terms of section 78(b) a 
representative trade union means a registered trade union, or two or 
more registered trade unions acting jointly, that have as members 
the majority of the employees employed by an employer in a 
workplace. 
These provisions exacerbates the high threshold set by section 80 
(1) of the Act. This provision disempowers the employees even 
further. It is totally contrary to the rationale for the establishment and 
purpose of workplace forums. It will also serve to marginalise smaller 
unions. 
47 Du Toit et al The LRA 1995 Supra 236 
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Like the high threshold of 100 employees- these pr9visions are not 
sensitive towards the needs and development of SMME's. What is 
the reasons for the bias in favour of majority trade unions? In order 
to answer this question one will again have to look at the position of 
the unions in South Africa's political socio-economic context. 
The institutionalization of our labour relations must of necessity be 
viewed as a means of promoting or achieving certain political and 
social ends. It has been said that "Law is a technique for the 
regulation of social power. This is true of labour law, as it is of other 
aspects of any legal system. Power- the capacity effectively to direct 
the behavior of others - is unevenly distributed in all societies. There 
can be no society without a subordination of some of its members to 
others, without command and obedience, without rule makers and 
decision makers. The power to make policy, to make rules and to 
make decisions, and to make sure that these are obeyed, is a social 
power. It rests on many foundations, on wealth, on personal prestige, 
on tradition, sometimes on physical force, often on sheer inertia. It is 
sometimes supported and sometimes restrained, and sometimes 
even created by the law, but the law is not the principal source of 
social power." 48 
Unions, and in particular those affiliated to COSATU has played a 
major role in demolition minority rule in South Africa. COSATU 
together with the Communist Party and the African National 
Congress formed the tripartite alliance and thought the elections as 
such. The formation of NEDLAC has further strengthened the 
position of COSATU affiliated unions because they are the biggest 
grouping. Around 43% of union members belonged - in 1995 - to 
GOSA TU affiliates. The balance belonged to unions affiliated to other 
national countries or to unaffiliated unions, There are at least three 
major union groupings to wit COSATU, NACTU and FEDSAL. 
According to BASKIN "over the last ten years union membership has 
more than doubled and currently stands at over three million". 49 
48 As quoted in P van Uyltrecht in Conflict, Power, Labour Relations and 
Labour Law 1995 ILJ Vol. 16, Part 1, Page 29 
49 Baskin J: Unoins at the Crossroads Can they make the transition 1996 
SALB Vol. 20, No. 1 
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However union membership has sharply decreased since 1990. 50 If 
one looks at the increase of membership from 1985 to 1993 then it 
becomes clear why labour was such an important partner for the 
ANC. In 1985 the registered members was 1 391 423 in 1993 the 
number was 2 890 174.50 
With all the potential; votes and historic power of labour a corporatist 
approach to industrial relations was inevitable. NEDLAC 
institutionalises tripartism and envisages the negotiation not only of 
labour policy but of key aspects fiscal, industry and development 
policy. It is paralleled in similar sectoral, industry regional and local 
institutions and forums throughout society. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that unions would like to keep their 
dominance at all levels. Minority unions do not have sufficient power 
and cant exert pressure on national policy making bodies such as 
NEDLAC. They are therefore due to their weakness doomed to the 
margins of industrial relations. , 
DISEMPOWERMENT OF EMPLOYEES 
Non unionised employees and employees belonging to minority 
unions are disempowered by the requirements for establishing 
workplace forums. There tends to be a ever increasing need for 
workers to have more say in the workplace. The purpose of second 
channel institutions, like workplace forums is to give workers a voice 
in the governance of the shop floor and the firm, and to facilitate 
communication and co-operation between management and labour 
on production-related matters, more or less free of direct distributive 
conflicts over wages. 51 
Campling conducted a study amongst lightly and non union firms in 
Australia in 1995. The case study evidence indicated that lightly or 
non union firms were motivated to secure enterprise agreements due 
to one, or a combination of, the following four reasons: 
• a competitive and/or technological necessity for work 
reorganisation 
50. Ibid 
51. Rogers J and Wolfgang Sin working under different rules: Freeman R 
(ed) Russel Sage Foundation New York 1994 
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• the desire to develop a less conflictional and more co-operative 
and participative industrial relations and workplace culture 
• to formalise, consolidate and codify existing employment and 
work organisation practices and finally 
• to marginalise the workplace influence of trade unions 52 
Except for the last reason all the others can be accepted as universal 
amongst most workers. The call for participatory structures by unions 
was generally answered with a view of giving employees more power 
in the workplace. 
In Germany, as was pointed out above, three employees with voting 
rights or any trade union represented in the establishment can trigger 
the process whereby work councils has to be established. The works 
council is not the union. The union - in Germany - is viewed as an 
outside force and the workers council as a inside group. Unions 
however play a major role in the election process of workers councils 
where there is no works council in existence. 53 
In Spain the emphasis is also on the number of employees in a work 
centre. In France the establishment of an enterprise Committee is 
mandatory if there are more than 50 employees in the workplace or 
enterprise. The responsibility for creating enterprise, establishment 
and central enterprise committees rests with the employer who must 
organise elections and is legally liable for not doing so. The employer 
must also take the initiative in organising elections of the enterprise 
committee at least once every two years. 
Besides, within that period on the request of an individual employee 
or a representative union the employer must organise elections 
within one month of the request. The employer must also firstly 
before elections are held inform the personnel about the elections by 
posting of a notice and inviting representative unions to nominate 
lists of candidates. The employer is however not held responsible if 
no committee exists after he/she has taken the appropriate steps for 
elections. Only representative unions may nominate candidates at 
52 Campling J T: Enterprise Bargaining in Lightly and Non-Unionsed Firms: 
Comparative Australian Case Study: The IJ of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations Winter 1996 page 315 at 320 
53 Summers C Supra 
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the first ballot. Every representative labour union at the enterprise 
level has the right to send one and only one delegate to the 
committee. This delegate must work in the enterprise and fulfill the 
conditions of eligibility to serve on the committee. 
In the Netherlands the establishment of works councils is also 
mandatory in certain instances. If the enterprise employs one 
hundred or more employees than the establishment of a works 
councils is mandatory. The act was later amended and it made the 
establishment of a works council mandatory also in enterprises with 
less than 100 workers provided at least 35 workers were engaged for 
more than one third of the normal working time (at the moment on 
average 38 hours a week). Finally there is also a form of direct 
participation for enterprises where at least 10 persons but less than 
35 are employed. In such enterprises the employer must hold a 
meeting with his personnel at least twice a year. Furthermore the 
employer must discuss, amongst other things, the general state 
of affairs with his workers at least once a year and provide them with 
data on the results of the enterprise as well as its prospects. 54 
In Sweden on the other hand participation at all levels is through the 
unions, and representation at the enterprise or plant level is tied 
closely to the union that makes collective agreement. 55 In Sweden 
the works councils are formed in terms of the co-determination act. 
They all have collective agreements as their basis. The 
establishment of works councils is mandatory. 
The labour Relations is based - like in the United States of America-
on voluntarism. In Sweden the works council "was a medium for 
information and joint consultation between the management and the 
employees through their trade union (observe the wording) within the 
enterprise. 56 The employer on any matter relating to the relationship 
between the employer and any member of the organisation who is or 
has been employed by that employer. An employer shall have a 
54 Rood MG The Netherlands in Blanpain (ed) Supra Vol 9 page 82 
55 Summers C: Worker participation in Sweden and the United States: 
Some Comparisons from an American perspective 1994 Univ of 
Pennsylvania Law Review Page 175 at 178 
56 Adlercreutz A Sweden in Blanpain (ed) Supra Vol. 12, Page 213 
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corresponding right to negotiate with an organisation of employees. 
A right of negotiation under the first part of this section shall also be 
enjoyed by the organisation of employers in relation to any 
organisation to which the employer belongs, and by the employer's 
organisation in relation to the organisation of employees. 
Section 11 of the Act also imposes on the employer a so called 
primary duty to negotiate. It reads as follows: 
"Before an employer decides on important alteration to his activity, 
he shall, on his own initiative, negotiate with an organisation of 
employees in relation to which he is bound by collective agreement. 
The same shall be observed before an employer decides on 
important alteration of work or employment conditions for employees 
who belong to the organisation. If urgent reasons so necessitate, the 
employer may make and implement a decision before he has fulfilled 
his duty to negotiate under the first part of this section." 
The employer in Sweden can therefore not make unilateral changes 
without consulting the union. The Swedish Co determination Act 
stands on the premise that management and the employees are 
partners in the enterprise and that the employees are entitled to 
participate in decision making. The employees as partners are 
therefore entitled to know of all aspects of the business and to a 
voice in all its activities. s? 
In Japan on the other hand there are strong enterprise unions who 
bargain on enterprise level only. The enterprise union is a union that 
is organised exclusively by the employees in a particular enterprise. 
Since all employees in an enterprise - except supervisory personnel 
and temporary workers - are entitled to join unions the enterprise 
union in the larger enterprises often organise nearly all the 
employees at the plant level, if they are majority unions, they are 
responsible for accepting overtime agreements, voicing the 
employees opinion of any proposed new work rules and representing 
the employees on several committees, including those on safety and 
hygiene in the plant. All these tasks are imposed by various laws.sa 
57 Summers Clyde Worker participation in Sweden and USA Supra 203 
58 HANAMI TA Japan in Blanpain (ed) Supra Vol. 7 at 115 
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The overview of a few different systems show that in neither of the 
systems is there a reliance on majority unions to trigger the 
establishment of workplace forums or works councils. In some 
countries like the Netherlands and France it is mandatory if the 
employees reach a certain number. In other countries - like Germany 
- also a certain number of employees may decide to trigger the 
process. In other countries where works councils are not 
institutionalised it is up to the union to decide to implement works 
councils by way of collective agreements. In Sweden the unions 
have, in any event, co-determination rights that is statutorily defined. 
The employer is however given the right in certain extreme cases to 
implement certain changes without negotiating with he employees. 
In Japan where the system is strictly based on collective bargaining 
with strong enterprise level bargaining the employees rights and 
interest are protected by enterprise level unions. 
It is totally unacceptable that workers will only be able to enjoy the 
fruits of workplace forums if the majority union is of the view that the 
time is ripe to trigger the process. Minority unions will practically have 
no say in such workplaces and will slowly wither away. Bendix is of 
the view that the decision to assign the triggering process to majority 
unions was a political decision. She states that "They (i.e. the 
legislator) have inadvertently expressed the opinion that, despite 
recent developments, the majority of South African employees are 
not capable of asserting themselves and their rights in an 
organisational context; alternatively, that employees who are 
unionised are not sophisticated enough to make a significant 
contribute on their own, that they may be swamped in forums by non-
unionised (mostly white collar) employees and that they therefore 
need the union to support them ... Many employees may lack 
education, but a lack of education is not synonymous with a lack of 
intelligence and opinions. It could be alleged that both unions and 
the legislature have underestimated South African employees and 
that, had they not done so, they would have provided all employees 
with legislated rights to participation and to the necessary education 
and training ... On the other hand, if they were of the opinion that 
employees were not yet capable of effective representation on 
workplace forums, then the provisions should never have been 
instituted as they would be bound to failure or subject to misuses by 
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either employers or unions. "59 I fully agree with the sentiment. 
THE POSITION OF SMME's 
There is another dimension to this provision. It is the position of the 
SMME's. In most countries SMME's are barely organised let alone 
unionised. Workers in SMME's sometimes find themselves in a 
vulnerable situation because their employment is not stable and 
protection offered to them is non existent or very limited. They are in 
most cases not allowed to participate in trade union activities. If they 
do they do so at peril to be dismissed. According to Biagi in most 
SMME's "it is more appropriate to speak of under representation 
rather than representation." He states that "the relationship between 
company size, and the level of unionisation is well known, and the 
phenomenon of lower unionisation of smaller companies may be 
observed in several countries. "ao In France, less than 40% of 
workers employed in the enterprises with between ten and forty 
employees elect personnel delegations. Only about 75% of this 
enterprises with between fifty and one hundred employees have a 
works council, and only 55% of enterprises with more than fifty 
employees have trade union delegates. 
In Britain, where union figures have fallen the past 10 to 15 years, 
only 8% of small companies are unionised. In Germany where there 
is a powerful centralised collective bargaining system and a 
exemplary works council system the figures are also not that 
wonderful. In Germany works councils have been found in only about 
6% of establishments with between five and twenty employees. 
In 1989 a study commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment in the Netherlands found that only 42% of the 9100 
companies with between thirty-five and one hundred workers have 
a representative body, and that only 40% of these enjoy anything 
more than extremely limited rights. Of the companies with between 
thirty-five and one hundred employees that are obliged to have 
59 Bendix as quoted in Olivier Supra 810 
60 Biagi Supra 257 
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representative bodies, only 62 to 74% do in fact have such bodies. 
Twenty percent of companies of this size have no from of 
representative body or otherwise. 61 
In Greece a minimum of twenty employees is required to establish a 
trade union. In companies with fewer than twenty employees, in 
Greece, there can be no trade union activity or representation. If at 
least ten employees are employed they may establish a quasi-union 
body. This arrangement is only valid for six months and it must be 
declared valid by a justice of the peace. This arrangement is however 
only possible if the overall number of employees is not greater than 
forty and if there is no other union having more than half of the 
employees as its members. 
With the marginalization of SMME's, the Labour Relations Act and 
particularly the provisions on workplace forums perpetuate the dual 
system of industrial relations. On the one hand there is a system for 
employees who are unionised and work in big enterprises and on the 
other hand there is a system for employees who are invariably not 
unionised and employed in small, medium and micro enterprises. A 
study that was done of Western Cape hives owned by the Small 
Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in 1991 revealed a 
number of problem areas ranging from inadequate health and safety 
precautions to neglect of basic labour rights. Du Toit further stated 
that Although certain of the hives had been exempted from industrial 
council agreements and other regulatory statutes, employers in the 
hives were bound by their contracts with SBDC to maintain certain 
basic standards. Moreover they were arguably, under closer 
supervision from hive managers than the vast majority of small 
employers outside the hive, where industrial council inspectors are 
very few in number and enforcement of applicable rules remain, at 
best, haphazard. 62 He further states that although there was no 
systematic study of working conditions in SMME's in the formal 
sector, anecdotal evidence suggests that violations of labour rights 
and protective laws are considerably more widespread here than on 
the hives. 
61 Ibid 
62 Du Toit D Small Enterprises, Industrial Relations and the RDP 1995 ILJ 
Vol. 16, Part 3, Page 546 footnote 9 
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Management in small business do not always welcome unionisation 
with open arms. They see any invasion of their managerial 
prerogative as an attempt to take over the enterprise. Unions are 
seen as trouble makers, who will instill in employees an adversarial 
attitude that will culminate in endless strikes and strike at the 
workplace. 
Du Toit argues strongly in favour of encouraging unionization of 
SMME's. Although Du Toit argues in favour of collective bargaining 
in the SMME sector, those comments are also relevant for SMME's 
in a co-determination/workplace forum set-up. He states forcefully 
that "there can be no collective bargaining in the SMME sector 
without extending the frontiers of trade unionism. "53 
How does one move towards unionization if management is hostile? 
There are obstacles abound for unions. They will have to deal with 
employer hostility and obstructiveness, reluctance of workers to, 
quite rightly in our economic times, jeopardise their jobs, and the 
"sheer logistical difficulties of organising and servicing a multitude of 
workplaces containing relatively small numbers of members."54 
In the Australian study of light and non-unionised firms, one of the 
respondents, a construction company, argued that the 
marginalisation of the building union was a prerequisite for improving 
the workplace culture.6s For management the productivity benefits 
of moving from a conflictual low trust relationship with the union and 
employees to a co-operative high trust relationship made the 
substantial investment of management resources into the enterprise 
bargaining process worthwhile. With improved workplace labour -
management relations the firm believed that it could achieve the 
longer - term aim of establishing a participative and high commitment 
workplace culture which would deliver increased, productivity quality 
and identification of company goals. What emerges is that 
management equates high productivity and quality with the absence 
of unions. For management the first step is to ostracise the union 
and deal with the employees in a "union free" enterprise. 
63 Ibid 
64 Du Tait Ibid 554 
65 Campling JT Supra 322 
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Where there is union involvement in SMME's they (the unions) are 
seen as a threat. Where there is no union involvement the basic 
labour rights of employees are disregarded and the employees are 
subjected to harsh conditions of employment. 
Union are also to be blamed for the maltreatment of employees in 
SMME's. Unions are traditionally more concerned about boosting 
membership and unionising big enterprises. This drive to unionise 
big enterprises comes at a price. The price is unfortunately the 
employees in SMME's. Du Tait says that "unions have tended to give 
little priority to the organisation of workers in SMME's as a result of 
the organisational difficulties involved, the relatively limited results 
attendant on such efforts and what are perceived as more pressing 
demands on their already strained resources."66 Du Tait also pleads 
for a integrated support programme for SMME's, that brings with it 
a greater commitment to fair employment practices. Modern 
industrial relations on the part of employers, could increase the 
scope for workers to exercise their legal rights without fear of 
victimization. 
In order to accommodate SMME's and to facilitate their moving into 
the mainstream. Du Tait makes three suggestions. Only two of these 
are currently relevant. Firstly he states that a support programme 
could subsidise unions for the specific purpose of expanding their 
organizing efforts in that sector. This will obviously bring about 
greater union representation in the SMME sector. With this improved 
representation comes inevitable spin-offs like collective bargaining 
powers, co-operation between management and unions and 
improved productivity which might lead to better wages. Health and 
Safety Standards will also be adhered to if the unions can vigorously 
fulfill their watchdog role. This involvement of unions in the SMME 
sector will create opportunities for unions and management to 
explore whether they cant enter into "workplace forum like" 
agreements. 
The other point is that the establishment of industrial districts to 
promote economic and technical co-operation among small 
66 Du Toit D Small Enterprises ... Supra 555 
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employers could create territorial bases for trade unions. Structures 
encompassing numbers of workplaces which might be too small to 
be organised individually. This concept is also not entirely new. In 
Italy SMME's engage in special industry-wide collective bargaining, 
performed by autonomous employers association established to 
represent smaller companies. 
Spanish law on the other hand provides that as few as six employees 
may bargain collectively. In fact there are many company 
agreements in Spanish enterprises with fewer than fifty workers, and 
even some in enterprises with fewer than twenty-five workers. Biagi 
however points out that these agreements is to exempt the 
company's employees from the application of agreement of wider 
scope, thereby permitting inferior working conditions as compared to 
those provided for in more comprehensive agreements. 67 
To guard against "agreed exploitation" it would always be better for 
the process of workplace participation by means of collective 
agreements to be union driven. It would be practically, tactically and 
strategically more viable for unions if they operate and represent 
workers in SMME's in territorial units and not as enterprise units. In 
this case one thinks of the industrial hives that are managed and 
financed by the SBDC. Why cant a hive have one employees 
organisation. Those bodies will then negotiate and enter into 
collective agreements that will ensure worker participation via the 
union or otherwise in the workplace. In Italy there have been 
numerous instances in which territorial units where created and 
financed by employers. The financing necessary for performing 
representative activity is requested and obtained from the employers. 
It is then managed by bodies where representatives of both labour 
and management are represented. 
What we need to do is to investigate the viability of such structures 
with the specific aim of creating by way of collective agreements 
structures for worker participation. In view of their inability to 
successfully organise workers in this sector, trade unions cannot 
easily monitor the implementation of the labour standards or the 
improvement of conditions of employment by only concluding 
67 Biagi Supra 270 
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collective agreements. Trade unions therefore have to make 
concerted efforts to provide information and offer advise on the 
legislation in force, and to strike for increased protection by 
proposing legislative amendments. Obviously, when trade unions are 
not strong they cannot effectively conclude collective agreements. 
They may assist in the establishment of participative and consultative 
machineries with individual employers, groups of small enterprises 
or public authorities. By doing so, they may contribute to the 
improvement of the employment relationship and encourage the 
state to more actively support the workers concerned. They may also 
encourage the state, such as is the case in Japan to promote 
associations or groupings of small enterprises to initiate measures 
for improving working conditions among member undertakings. 68 
It would take considerate time, resources and repositioning if the 
whole provisions pertaining to workplace forums were amended to 
accommodate SMME's. It is a known fact that SMME's sometimes 
face special difficulties in applying labour legislation which has not 
been concerned with the specific character of smaller enterprises in 
mind. The problem of the insensitive nature - towards SMME's - of 
the workplace forums provisions highlights the fact that differentiation 
between small and large companies frequently means separation 
between a relatively protected area, in which forms of "industrial 
democracy" are practiced, and weak areas in which the logic of 
market forces is predominantly uncontrolled. 
The low rate of unionization and weak collective action in SMME's 
should drive all the parties concerned to look for more workable and 
practical solutions in order to achieve cooperative instead of 
conflictual industrial relations in SMME's. The LRA as it is currently 
structures does not lend itself to such a goal. 
OTHER "FAVOURABLE" PROVISIONS 
It is not only the triggering process that favours majority unions. 
There are other provisions- which will be discussed below - that also 
unashamedly favour majority unions. These provisions must also be 
68 See services Supra 125 
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seen in the broader context because "in the final analysis, industrial 
relations can be understood and explained only as an offshoot of all 
the characteristic features of a given society - economic and legal, 
political and cultural, rational and irrational. Therefore, anybody who 
attempts to understand the industrial relations system of another 
country needs to acquire a knowledge and understanding of all the 
characteristics of that country."sg These provisions are also 
manifestation of the strength of the labour movement of South Africa. 
Majority unions have a privileged and protected role in South African 
labour relations when it comes to workplace forums. These 
provisions also flies in the face of the aims and functions of 
workplace forums. 
It must be remembered that workplace forums must in terms of 
Section 79 of the Act: 
seek to promote the interest of all employees in the workplace, 
whether or not they are trade union members; 
seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace .... 
Section 81 (1) of the Act however provide for the establishment of a 
union based workplace forum. In terms of this section "If a 
representative union is recognised in terms of a collective agreement 
by an employer for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect of 
all the employees in a workplace, that trade union may apply to the 
commission in the prescribed form for the establishment of a 
workplace forum." This in effect means that a majority union or 
unions acting in concert may apply for the establishment of a 
workplace forum. A minority union does not have that right 
irrespective of the number of employees it represents. 
This provision also creates problems for majority unions, because a 
majority union will have to satisfy all the requirements of the section 
before it will be able to apply for the establishment of a workplace 
forum. The requirements of the section are: 
the union must be recognised in terms of a collective 
agreement by an employer 
69 Schregle J: Comparative Industrial Relations: pitfalls and potentials 120 
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it must be a representative trade union as defined in the Act 
it must be recognised for collective bargaining purposes and 
it must be recognised for collective bargaining purposes in 
respect of all employees in the workplace. 
As mentioned above unions have traditionally negotiated and 
organised as bargaining agents for the particular bargaining units, 
and very seldom in respect of all employees in a workplace, this 
provision would necessitate, in most instances at least, a 
renegotiation of recognition agreements so that unions that want to 
proceed along this route could qualify. It would also mean that unions 
acting jointly will have to make sure that their bargaining units should 
include all "employees" in the workplace in order to meet the 
requirements of section 81 ( 1 ). These stringent requirements might 
put union based workplace forums beyond the reach of most 
employees. Mayer points out that section 81 was enacted to "please 
the unions." He points out that the possibility for this option - union 
based workplace forums - is very limited. He quite rightly states that 
it doesn't apply unless a union is already recognised by an employer 
for the purpose of the collective agreements of all employees in the 
workplace - which (most importantly) is hardly existing anywhere. 70 
In Germany unions don't have a monopoly to call for the 
establishment of works councils. Unions have however a right to call 
for the establishments of a works council. They can call a works 
meeting of the employees in order to arrange for elections. Unions 
in Germany are further "privileged in nominating candidates for 
election. A list of union candidates doesn't need a petition signed by 
a specific number or percentage of employees as the list of non-
union candidates."71 
In Sweden collective agreements are negotiated by national unions 
on an industry-wide basis, and under the 1976 Co-determination Act 
(MBL) the legal right to co-determine at the enterprise level runs 
almost exclusively to unions that have collective agreements. If the 
problem at enterprise level involves only members of a union that 
70 MAYER UDO: The German system of worker Participation: A model for 
South Africa Institute of Development Labour Law UCT 
71 Ibid 
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has not entered into a collective agreement of the employer is still 
required to negotiate with a union to which the particular employees 
belong. 
In the United States of America representation at the enterprise level 
is tied closely to the union that makes the collective agreement. In 
the US the majority union is the exclusive representative, for 
purposes of negotiating collective agreements, and the employer is 
prohibited by law from negotiating with anyone other than the 
majority union. 
The similarities between the USA and Sweden are apparent because 
both countries depend in principal on the free choice of the 
employee. Enterprise structures are not institutionalised like in 
Germany or France. 
If a union qualifies for a trade union based workplace forum it may, 
in terms of section 81 (2), choose the members of the workplace 
forum from among its elected representatives in the workplace. This 
provision "appears to be a concession to COSATU's proposal that 
the composition of the workplace forum should be the shopstewards 
committee."72 
Olivier points out that this provision potentially undermines the notion 
that representatives at this level should be democratically elected, 
and that the workplace should directly be involved - otherwise the 
forum could be seen as just another union too and employees could 
be discouraged from participating meaningfully in a body which is 
suppose to be independent and separate from unions, both 
institutionally and structurally. 
If workplace forum members are chosen from among the unions 
elected representatives there would be no "democratic" election at 
the workplace. The members of the workplace forums will also be 
members of the shopsteward's committee. They will be wearing two 
hats when dealing with the employer. They would, as members of the 
workplace forum, need to seek to enhance efficiency in the 
workplace and promote the interest of all employees in the 
72 Du T oit et al Supra 243 
42 
workplace, whether or not they are union members. As members of 
the shopstewards committee they will have to represent the interest 
of the union members who in most cases democratically elected 
them to be shopstewards. Du Tait points out that "If the same 
individuals constitute both bodies, their meetings as a workplace 
forum should be demarcated from their meetings as a shopstewards' 
committee to reduce the possibility of procedural challenges. Even 
so, the potential for conflicts of interest - for example, if the 
enterprise is in financial difficulty - remains obvious." 73 
In Germany and the Netherlands there is also a tension in the 
function of works councils. · 1n Germany works councils and 
employers must discuss matters " with an earnest desire to reach 
agreement and make suggestion for settling their differences. In the 
Netherlands works councils are established for the dual purpose of 
the effective functioning of the enterprise and representation of 
employees. The tension is less pronounced however, in that the 
works council is a separate body from the trade unions branch. It 
does not have to accommodate the entire spectrum of enterprise and 
employees interest within its own decisions but may - and in practice 
often does - arrive at a practical division of labour within the union. 
74 
Majority unions may also, by wa'y of collective agreements with the 
employer, determine which matters are open to consultation and over 
which matters must joint decisions be taken. They therefore have the 
right to set the agenda and determine what will take place in 
workplace forums. (sec 84 (1) and (3) section 86 (1) and (2). If a 
matter is regulated by a collective agreement the workplace forum is 
barred from dealing with it. There is nothing sinister in this provision 
because such a provision does also lead to industrial peace and co-
operation. It also eradicates duplication - because in its absence the 
employer will have to agree with the workplace forum and with the 
majority union on the same issue. 
73 Du T oit et al The LRA Supra 243 
74 Ibid 
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Olivier however points out that these wide ranging powers are within 
the South African context statutorily restricted to majority unions and, 
secondly that the powers should not be seen in isolation but against 
a background of extraordinary privileges being accorded to these 
unions. He further stresses that the dominant position and role of 
the unions might seriously hamper the growth of workplace forums 
as independent bodies that play a constructive part in the day - to 
day relationship between the employer. 75 
In terms of section 82 (1) (v) and (w) the employer and majority 
union/ representative trade union may by agreement change the 
constitution of the workplace forum and establish the manner in 
which decisions are to be made. It must be remembered that the 
constitution of a workplace forum can be the product of an 
agreement of all registered trade unions which have employees in 
the workplace and the employer. 76 Although Olivier finds this a 
"rather strange" provision there seems to be merit in such a 
dispensation. If a union becomes the majority union as defined in sec 
81 (1) of the Act it acts and deals with the employer in respect of all 
the employees. Why must it be bound by a constitution that is a 
product of co-operation between itself and other rival unions and the 
employer? There might be provisions in the constitution that is a 
product of compromise with which the current majority union does 
not agree. What this provision reflects however is that the majority 
union is given extensive powers to determine the functioning and 
operation of workplace forums. 
In term of section 82 (1) (f) if another registered trade union becomes 
representative, it may demand a new election at any time within 
twenty-one months after each preceding election. If one accepts that 
workplace forums are totally independent of unions then one might 
have a problem with this provision. However practice and lesson 
from other jurisdictions reveals that unions are a dominant driving 
force behind works councils or rather seconds channel institutions. 
As will be pointed out later the relationship between works councils 
and other unions in Germany for example is much closer than the 
75 Olivier Supra 811 
76 See section 80(a) of the Act 
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law indicates. The solution to this problem would be for the new 
representative trade union to wait until the next election of the 
workplace forum members. Union membership is influenced by many 
factors. There seems to me to be no reason why the existence of the 
workplace forum must be coupled with union strength. 
In terms of section 82 (1) (u) only office bearers or officials of 
representative unions may attend meetings of the workplace forum, 
including meetings with the employer or the employees. It is unclear 
why only majority unions are able to enjoy this privilege. The only 
inference to be drawn is that the legislature wanted to make 
workplace forums more attractive for majority unions. In Germany for 
instances all unions that have members as employees in the 
workplace are accorded certain rights and duties without any 
reference to their strength or representativeness in the workplace. I 
fully agree with Grogan when he questions "whether a workplace 
forum packed with members of a majority union will constantly fulfill 
its statutory task of protecting the interest of all employees, non 
members included, may be too much to expect."n 
It is clear that majority unions wield considerable power to establish 
and control the functioning of workplace forums. Why the legislature 
decided to link workplace forums to unions is unclear. The only 
explanation is political. The lessons in countries such as France, 
Germany and the Netherlands is that the functioning of these 
institutions must not depend on union strength or weakness. Olivier 
puts it succinctly that "It appears that we still have to take note of the 
experience of other systems where the independent nature of the two 
bodies and the functions exercised by them are taken for granted, 
irrespective of the personnel and functional links that may exist and 
irrespective of whatever measure of influence unions might be able 
to exercise in practice. "78 
77 Grogan J: Poor Relations: Minority Unions under the new LRA 1996 
Employment Law Vol. 13, No. 2, page 27 
78 Olivier Supra 812 
45 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE UNIONS AND WORKPLACE 
INSTITUTIONS 
( 
Workplace institutions can take different forms. It can be statutorily 
institutionalised and "independent" of unions. It can be union driven 
like in Sweden and Japan or it can be a ordinary agreement between 
employees and the employer, as is the case in Italy. 
Rogers and Sreeck make the same point and state that "where there 
are workplace based unions, as in Japan, employees articulate their 
interests through the union, and second channel arrangements take 
the form of labour - management consultation committees. Where 
unions are centralised at the national or sectoral level, outside the 
firm - as in the Netherlands and Germany - or where unions are weak 
and not widely present at the workplace - as in France and Spain -
second channel functions are usually performed by what are known 
as works councils." 
In South Africa workplace forums could be the answer to the 
undemocratic practices in some workplaces. Workplace forums could 
provide unions with the necessary mechanisms to exalt the quality 
of working life and prevent management from unilaterally 
restructuring the workplace. They also offer the unions an 
opportunity to intervene in management decision making and to be 
part of the productive process. Unions are acutely aware of the 
considerable gains that can be made if they participate in the 
process. Marcel Golding the ex NUM assistant general secretary 
spelled out the vision of unions along the following lines: "There are 
two ways we can respond. We can either stand by while the process 
takes place or we can become centrally involved. Our union will fight 
to be a central player in the management of transition ... For us the 
struggle for greater control over the production process is starting 
with participation ... We are now talking about one of the most critical 
areas itself, the workplace, and participation in decisions made at the 
workplace. We are firing the first shots in beginning to challenge 
managerial prerogative in the production process. We've already 
challenged managerial prerogative on dismissals and other abuses. 
79 Supra 97 
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But I think through this we are beginning to challenge managements 
prerogative in decision-making over what they believed was their 
exclusive right - setting targets, setting the production plan."ao 
Regrettably the unions have not lived up to the challenge to grab the 
chance to pierce managerial prerogative. Up to now unions have 
been very cautious about workplace forums. 
This begs the question why unions are so slow to embrace these 
structures? What are the advantages or disadvantages for unions? 
Are these structures a threat to unions? Do unions have the capacity 
to embrace and successfully drive these institutions? 
Streeck argues that there is a relation between union strength and 
workplace participation. He points out that the USA and Britain have 
considerable problems with their industrial relations, unions have not 
fared well in those countries in the last 10 to 15 years, because they 
have no works councils or co-determination structures. Whereas in 
countries like Germany, Sweden and Italy in the 1970's and 1980's, 
council like structures emerged and contributed significantly to the 
strength of the labour movements and to their capacity to survive the 
pressures of restructuring and internasionalisation. To substantiate 
his point he give an example of six European countries and the 
percentage of the workforce which is unionised in each country; 
Germany 38%, Netherlands 26%, France 10%, Spain 10 - 15%, 
Sweden 85% and Italy 39%.a1 
These arguments must not be accepted at face value. It is true that 
American and British unions are facing and experiencing more 
difficulties than their Swedish and German counterparts, in making 
their influence felt in industrial relations and in the society at large. 
There are however numerous factors that contribute to this · 
phenomenon. 
Some of the factors are government policy, attitude of the role 
players and the overall environment within which they operate. 
Pankert in analysing certain monographs that were received by the 
80 As quoted in Van Holdt Karl: What is the future of labour? 1992 SALB 
Vol. 16, No. 8 
81 Streeck W: Supra 89 - 90 
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ILO states the following "The central idea is that the trade unions, as 
a consequence of an overall environment that is unfriendly to them, 
are insufficiently involved in many aspects of public and industrial life 
and that this lack of involvement unavoidably leads to a low 
performance of the national economy as whole. The United Stated 
monograph states for example that the countries with low union 
involvement are condemned to go up the "low road" by locking 
themselves into the vicious circle of low skills, low quality jobs, low 
wages and low productivity. Similarly, the United Kingdom 
monograph, referring to the policies of the Thatcher Government, 
states that "the publicly endorsed opposition to union involvement 
has encouraged employers to pursue low skill, low wage solutions to 
Britain's chronic problem to under investment.." and that Britain is in 
danger of being left without the means of winning consensus in 
industrial restructuring which exists in other countries, while trade 
unions are left out of the equation in so many areas of industrial and 
public life."a2 
On the other hand it must also be remembered that the Swedish and 
German unions do not find themselves in comparable situations: 
while many traditional features of the Swedish industrial relations 
system ( eg. the predominance of the LO on the union side; the 
importance given to the welfare state, to central bargaining and to 
the wage solidarity principle) have been under attack for some time, 
the key features of the German system (e.g. the simple trade union 
structure; the emphasis placed on branch level bargaining and co-
determination) are practically unchallenged. 
If on the other hand there is no will on the part of the management 
and employees to work together union density will also be adversely 
affected. Management will try its best to bash the union while the 
union will endeavour to obstruct all plans to restructure and 
reconstruct the workplace. Unions will have to be prepared to act 
jointly with employers and sometimes government to manage wealth 
82 PankertA: Adjustment Problems of Trade Unins in selected Industrialised 
Market Economy Countries: The Union own view International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 1993 Vol. 9, Page 3 at 
11 
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creation rather than seeking confrontation over wealth distribution. 
This was also a central theme in the monographs that Pankert 
analysed "the basic message of the monographs is that the scope of 
collective bargaining and/or workers' participation should be 
broadened and that the unions - while of course continuing to 
consider the defense of workers interests as their fundamental task -
are aware of the fact that excessively conflictual industrial relations 
as well as excessive rigidities in legislation and collective agreements 
are likely to have adverse effects on the competitiveness of the 
enterprises and on the national economy as a whole." 83 
What is unquestionable is the fact that the existence of strong unions 
at all levels (if they function at all levels) is per se indispensable for 
the national economy to regain competitiveness and to go up the 
high road of high skill, high quality jobs, high wages and high 
productivity. 
In Northern Europe where unions are strong, negotiations are 
centralised, and legal extension of collective contracts is easy, the 
scope for council activity is often explicitly defined to exclude 
subjects dealt with by unions and employers' associations outside 
the individual firm. For example the German Works Constitution Act 
forbids councils to bargain over basic wages and hold them legally 
responsible to uphold and supervise the implementation of any 
collective agreement applicable to their firm. Also councils are 
typically placed under a legal obligation to seek co-operation with the 
employer. Likewise the Co-determination Act of Sweden gives the 
union certain rights to information, consultation and joint decision 
making. Thus Belgium law declares that works councils "exists to 
promote collaboration between employer and employee" and in 
France where the Ministry of Labour extends collective agreements 
and where minimum wages are important, councils administer a 
firm's social funds but have little power in other areas. In contrast, 
where the external institutional structure is less elaborated like in 
Spain, Greece and Italy, council powers more closely resemble those 
of local unions. Spanish law permits councils to bargain over wages 
83 Ibid 12 
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and allows them to call strikes. In Italy, council functions are 
performed by union workplace organisations and the elected 
delegates, which for historical reasons often include workers not 
belonging to unions. 84 
In Germany works councils are entitled to close connections with 
unions. In Germany unionised councils work very closely with the 
union office either at the local or if it is a large firm at the national 
level. This close relationship involves in particular advise given by 
the union to the works councils. Works councils are however not 
unions although most of their members are union members. 
Speaking in favour of the German model Rogers and Streeck 
referring to works councils asserts "to be effective, they must be 
neither fish nor fowl - not merely disguised unions nor surely, 
disguised management. They are mixed institutions, varying along 
a line of compromise between worker interest in institutionalized 
representation and collective voice, and employer interests in 
workforce co-operation and communication to enhance economic 
performance."as They also make the point that the distribution of 
power between labour, capital and national labour relations will 
shape the form that the works councils will take. For instance, French 
councils are presided over by the employer German councils are 
worker only bodies. For most of the postwar period, Dutch councils 
were employer lead, but legal changes in the 1970's reorganised 
them on the German model. 
PROBLEMS FOR UNIONS 
The workplace forums as they are currently structured present a lot 
of problems. 
The first problem is the lack of a central bargaining system. This 
means that unions will have to be involved from two perspectives in 
the same workplace. Even in industries with centralised bargaining 
there tends to be workplace collective bargaining as well. Workplace 
forums and union representatives will invariably be the same people -
in that shopstewards will also be workplace forum members. This 
84 Rogers and Streeck Supra 100 
85 Ibid 103 
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could create demarcation conflicts between forums and confusion 
among workers and managers. Issues could be shunted back and 
forth between forums for expedient reasons, undermining the quest 
for new bargaining relations. It could also facilitate factionalism and 
divisions within unions between shop stewards in the workplace 
forum and shop stewards in the collective bargaining forum. 
Summers points out that "unless the bargaining council can and does 
limit supplementary bargaining by local union, the employer may be 
confronted with demands on both fronts. Each will compete for 
concessions, neither will be able to agree for less than the others 
demands, and under the proposal as now drafted either can call a 
strike. This is not likely to create a climate of co-operation and 
mutual problem solving" aa Olivier also refers to this problem and 
states that it is a peculiar characteristic of the South African labour 
relations scene, as majority unions are rooted on this level of the 
workplace, and even smaller unions prefer bargaining at plant level, 
at least to the extent that they are not bound to do so at central 
level.a? 
The other danger however is that management might use the two 
structures against each other. Managers might feel tempted to reject 
union proposals - in order to undermine their credibility - and then 
accept similar or the same proposals from workplace forums. In 
Germany, Sweden and Italy collective bargaining takes place in 
national industrial bargaining forums, while co-determination 
bargaining takes place in the workplace. Thus the more conflictual 
bargaining over wages and conditions does not interfere with 
negotiations over production·and management issues. Councils are 
generally aided (except in Spain) in performing this intermediate role 
not only by statutory supports but also by their insolation from wage 
setting. 
Will forums marginalise unions in the workplace? 
The two structures at enterprise level will be very onerous to 
86 Summers C: Workplace forums from a comparative Perspective Supra 
810. See also Von Holdt K: Workplace Forums: Can they tame 
management 1995 SALB Vol. 19, No. 1 
87 Olivier Supra 
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maintain. Over time it will be difficult to maintain two strong 
structures, both representing workers and both negotiating with 
management, at the same workplace. In general, the stronger 
structure will tend to drive out the weaker. In Sweden, before the Co-
determination Act in the 1970's weak forums with consultation rights 
were marginalised by the unions that had more power and credibility. 
In the Zambian Copperbelt, on the other hand, management 
succeeded in marginalising the unions by granting real benefits and 
improvements to workers through non-union forums.as The forums 
in South Africa have the potential to enjoy more privileges than 
shopstewards ie time-off, access to experts etc .. They might become 
stronger than union and marginalise unions. The only thing that can 
eradicate this threat is a clear move away from two structures that 
are both union driven at the workplace. 
In Germany work councils are used by unions as a organising tool. 
Unions have a right to be at works council meetings even if the works 
council does not want it to be present. Once a election takes place, 
unions can begin to put up candidates. Even if at the first election of 
work council the majority of the council members are not union 
members, with time they often become members, because they find 
out that without the training and the advise provided by the union 
they cannot perform their function properly/effectively. As a result the 
most common organising tactic a German union uses these days is 
to begin by setting up a works council and everything else follows.as 
There seems to be no clear answer. The unions will have to look at 
their peculiar circumstances and their position viz a viz the employer 
and non union members before it makes a choice for or against. 
Will unions have the capacity to cope with forums? 
The forums provide unions with the opportunity to increase capacity 
through rights to training, paid time off, full time representatives, 
administrative facilities and access to experts. Unions are unlikely to 
develop this capacity on their own without forums. Unions need not 
88 Von Holdt K: Workplace forums undermining unions 1995 SALB Vol. 19, 
No. 6, Page 59 at 62 
89 Streeck W Supra 93 
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negotiate every issue that is discussed at the forums. Unions could 
choose those issues of most concern to members. Unions will also 
have the capacity to negotiate better with the employer because of 
the information that they will get via workplace forums. 
Will forums co-opt unions? 
Unions in South Africa have a history of adversarial bargaining. They 
have been built around strategies of militant resistance. Forums will 
entail a greater emphasis on co-operation. But co-operation does not 
mean the end of struggle and conflict. According to Streeck Co-
determination is not necessarily identical with labour/management 
co-operation either. Very often under co-determination labour and 
management argue for a long time over a decision, for example the 
introduction of new technology. And they will have very different 
views on this at the beginning and they will need a long time to come 
to a consensual solution. This is not co-operative. Indeed it often 
requires that workers make their voices heard very strongly before 
management is willing to make a concession, and in this respect it 
is not so different from collective bargaining.go 
Unions must always stay focused on their goals and maintain their 
independence. They must be careful not to be co-opted in these 
structures at the expense 6f their members. Instead of co-option 
unions must seriously consider strategic unionism at this level. In 
short they must stop paying lip service to strategic unionism. 
Will union accommodate themselves to capitalism? 
Only a conscious and committed strategy by unions will be able to 
fight the capitalist onslaught on the union movement. As stated 
above strategic unionism is the only viable option for unions. It is I 
believe the only strategy that will be able to promote the unions 
agenda and the national agenda of economic development. 
Strategic unionism is a strategy for far reaching reform of the state, 
of the workplace, of economic decision-making and of civil society. 
It is a strategy driven by a broad based coalition of interest groups, 
90 Streeck W Supra 93 
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at the centre of which is the labour movement. Strategic unionism 
develops a step-by-step programme of radical reforms - each of 
which extends the arena of democratic decision-making and 
deepens the power of the working class.91 
Unions in South Africa will always be afraid that involvement in the 
workplace forums could increase workers identification with the 
interest of the enterprise and its productivity and competitive position, 
and so undermine class solidarity. However unions which organise 
in capitalist society always experience such pressures and already 
do so in SA. Unions have a choice, they can either succumb or they 
can limit these pressures to the extent that they maintain 
independent democratic goals in the workplace, and continue to 
campaign around natural collective bargaining, industrial and 
restructuring issues. 
WORKPLACE FORUMS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The traditional way of representing workers interest at the shop floor 
is through collective bargaining by unions. The introduction of second 
channel institutions to promote workplace democracy via statutory 
bodies very often raises union fears and anxieties that these bodies 
might usurp their role. 
This is however not always the case. In Germany unions bargain on 
a central level over wages and other distributive issues. At the 
enterprise level the unions are involved more in a advisory role. They 
guide and in most cases lead work councils. The two processes 
complement each other. The works councils are not substitutes for 
collective bargaining. Normally collective bargaining leads to 
collective agreements. Those agreements are concluded for a whole 
branch or at least for a region within a branch. According to Weiss 
one of the main problems of the German industrial relations system 
has to do with the inter-relationship of the two different levels.92 
91 Von Holdt K: Workplace Forum can they tame management Supra 34 
and Von Holdt K: Workplace Forums undermining unions: Supra 
92 Weiss M: Trade Union Rights in a Single ... Supra 64 
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In Sweden the system of collective bargaining is also centralised, 
with national industry agreements negotiated between national 
unions and national employer associations. According to Summers 
plarit organisations in Sweden are very weak or non-existent.93 
In America the unions are decentralised. In the remaining, I might 
add, unionised enterprises bargaining generally if not always only 
take place at enterprise level. Decentralisation in the USA is rooted 
in part in the legal principle of employees having a free choice. They 
have "the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing" in the words of section seven of the National Labour 
Relations Act. Summers states that to "maximize freedom of choice, 
subject to majority rule, the election or bargaining units are relatively 
small, often splitting a single enterprise into a number of units." It 
must however be pointed out that although the law is a 
"decentralizing force" it does not force unions not to combine 
bargaining units.94 
In Sweden the co-determination act empowers workplace 
involvement. The Act puts a duty on the employer to bargain with the 
trade union is the only bargaining agent for the employees. 
In Japan they have strong enterprise unions and they conduct all the 
bargaining on behalf of the employees. The enterprise unions are 
organised in such a fashion that all the employees are basically 
members of the union. The general pattern of bargaining within the 
enterprise in Japan is as follows: 
The enterprise union bargains about general working 
conditions and other issues applicable to all the plants and 
workplaces in the enterprise, and concludes agreements for 
the whole enterprise 
The plant branches of the union bargain with the plant 
managers about issues peculiar to the plant concludes 
agreements within the framework of the general agreement 
and negotiate over matters arising out of the application of the 
general agreement to the particular situation in the plant and 
93 Summers C: Workers Participation in Sweden and the USA Supra 189 
94 Ibid 
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The divisional branches within the plant have almost the same 
scope within their own range, except that on this level formal 
agreements are not generally concluded and informal 
understandings between the union representatives and the 
shop-floor supervisors are observed instead - as long as they 
do not contradict the principles established by the upper levels 
of institutionalised industrial relations in the enterprise 95 
It is evident from what was said above that workplace institutions and 
collective bargaining are not mutually destructive of each other. 
Depending on the peculiar circumstances and statutory regime of a 
particular country collective bargaining and institutionalised "second 
channel" forums can function side by side. Unions fears tend to 
exaggerate because in some countries like Germany unions actually 
use these councils as hunting ground. Unions can also use these 
structure to get much more information from employers. They can 
then bargain from a better position because they have more 
information.96 
The aim of workplace participatory structures nave, as their main 
aim, industrial peace and prosperity. The Zambian Labour Relations 
Act comprehensively states that the two main objectives of works 
councils are: 
to promote and maintain the effective participation of workers 
in the affairs of the undertaking 
to secure the mutual co-operation of workers, management 
and trade unions in the undertaking in the interest of industrial 
peace, improved working conditions, greater efficiency and 
productivity.97 
95 HANAMI TA Supra 115 
96 Information sharing, joint decision making and consultation rights is 
beyond the scope of this paper, therefore it is not discussed 




The attempt by the legislature to create workplace democracy in the 
form of workplace forums is sabotaged by the very provisions that 
are meant to facilitate it. The provisions pertaining to workplace 
forums will have to be amended because of the numerous problems 
that they create. 
The high threshold of 100 employees is totally inexplicable. It is also 
contrary to the trend in Europe where experiments with workplace 
structures were highly successful. Although union membership in the 
Netherlands is low their different regimes of participation in the way 
that the enterprise is run is attractive. In the Netherlands there are 
different regimes for enterprises of the following sizes: 
100 or more employees 
between 35 - 100 employees 
between 10 - 35 employees 
This is a option that will also be able to cater for the specific needs 
of workers in the SMME sector. These workers are the most 
vulnerable, exploited and deserving of protection. The sooner that 
workplace institutions can serve as a counterbalancing force the 
better. They will be able to tame managements attitude. The 
organizational problems that unions face, in this sector can also be 
addressed by a thorough investigation of the possibility of organizing 
forum along territorial lines. What will be important for small 
enterprises is not the enterprise itself but the geographical area 
within which it operates. Unions will have to take the geographical 
area into consideration when they organise. In Italy collective 
bargaining increasingly reflect the idea that territorial units and not 
company units should represent workers employed in smaller 
companies. This may lead to flexibility. According to Biagi these kind 
of agreements are prevalent in Italy. He also makes the point about 
flexibility and states "There, (in Italy) employer and employee 
represent~tives have agreed on provisions in the labor contracts that 
57 
show remarkable flexibility in working hours, night work, shift work, 
and remuneration."sa 
Such agreements are also very functional. They can promote 
uniformity. They can also serve as watchdogs over employees that 
make themselves guilty of gross violations of workers' labour rights. 
It is unfortunate that the legislature opted for a model that favours 
majority unions. There seems to be no rational reason why this route 
was chosen. The only inference it seems to me is that the legislature 
was influence by the unions potential strengths as a votes collector 
for the tripartite alliance. It is clear that unions wanted to be in the 
driving seat of these institutions. The bias in favour of majority unions 
not only marginalises smaller unions it also disempowers workers. 
Democracy and especially workplace democracy has been identified 
as a very important ingredient in harmonious relations between 
labour and management. There are indications that workplace 
democracy lead to efficiency in the workplace. Efficiency on the other 
hand enhances productivity. Productivity is not only beneficial for the 
national economy and management it also has positive spin off for 
employees. A productive firm can make more profits - with more 
profits management will not be able to justify the absence of wage 
increase when those are bargained with the unions, at any level. 
It is understandable that unions will fear being undermined by these 
structures. These fears are however unfounded because unions can 
always enter into collective agreements with the employer and put 
certain topics beyond the jurisdiction of workplace forums. The union 
can effectively snooker many issues that may or may not be raised 
in workplace forums. If a collective agreement requires a matter to 
be raised with the union then the forum will not deal with that issue. 
The employer and union can also agree to add to the matters which 
must be dealt with. 
If the power to trigger the establishment of workplace forums is given 
to unions that are sufficiently representative more workplace forums 
will be formed. Unions must however have the opportunity to 
98 Biagi Supra 270 
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nominate candidates to workplace forums. The election of the 
candidates must be a open process in other words all employed in 
the workplace must be able to vote for the nominated candidates. In 
this manner democracy is taken to its logical meaning. 
The other issue that will have to be looked at, is the fact that 
workplace forums have been given the right to strike.99 The German 
Works Council Act for example clearly states that works councils 
and management shall work together in a spirit of mutual trust and 
shall discuss matters at issue with an earnest desire to reach 
agreement and make suggestions for settling their differences. 
Schregle states that employer and work council are not allowed to 
exercise pressure on each other by industrial action. This means that 
works council may not call a strike to press their demand (although 
it does not affect the right of works council members, as of all other 
workers, to strike in support of collective bargaining demands put 
forward by the trade union.100 
In Spain and Greece, where the external institutional structures is 
less elaborated council powers resembles those of local unions. 
Spanish law in fact permits councils to bargain over wages and 
allows them to call strikes. I can't but agree with Olivier when he 
says that the right of workplace forums to strike is unfortunate and 
that this could ruin the whole endeavour and introduce adversarial 
elements into the relationship.101 What the act should rather foster 
is a development of a new spirit in the enterprise. The new spirit 
must be one of concertation and not adversarialism. The parties 
must move away from the they/we/us them mentality which currently 
characterises over labour relations system. 
The other problem that will have to be investigated and remedied is 
the dissolution of the forums. Only a representative trade union may 
request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum. If more than 50% of 
the employees who have voted in the ballot in support of the 
99 See Du T oit et al Supra 
100 SCHREGLE J: Co-determination in the FRG: A comparative view 1978 
lnternation Labour Review Vol. 117, No. 1 83 
101 Olivier op cit 813 
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dissolution of the workplace forum, the workplace forum must be 
dissolved. It is regrettable that these institutions which are supposed 
to usher us into a world of competitiveness, efficiency, co-operation 
between management and workers can be killed at the whim of a 
majority union. 
What happens if the members of a workplace forum fall to below 
100? The act is silent on this aspect. In Belgium, when the number 
of the employees fall to below 100 the competence of the works 
councils will be carried by the committee of hygiene. In France the 
works council continues even if the number of employees fall below 
the threshold of fifty. Its survival is guaranteed unless the employer 
and the trade unions agree to abolish it or unless the director of the 
office of labour and employment at the departmental level so 
decides. 
It is hoped that unions will soon start embracing these forums as part 
of union strategy to boost overall national economy. Unions in South 
Africa are positioned in such a way that they have no choice but to 
consider, strongly, participatory structures. 
Industrial peace is now more than ever in the unions' interests. 
Already COSATU's companies have made investments worth billions 
· of rands. They partly own a bank, an insurance company, transport 
concerns, a slew of information technology companies, a television 
station and are major shareholders in YFM, South Africa's most 
successful radio station.102 
With the necessary political will and the will to create a conducive 
legislative framework, workplace forums can indeed become 
everything that the drafters of the Act hoped it would be. They 
thought workplace forums are the right weapon to kill all the strike 
and strive in the workplace. For now they are a gun with a 
dysfunctional trigger!!! 
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